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COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
I. SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION AND SECTION 605 OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT-THE PATHOLOGY OF 
AN ANTIQUATED STATUTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, l the 
Ninth Circuit held that over-the-air subscription television 
(STV) is not broadcasting for the use of the general public and 
is, therefore, protected by section 605 of the Communications 
Act of 1934.1 By ruling that section 605 prohibits the intercep-
1. 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Trask, J., the other panel members were Schroe-
der, J. and Carroll, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103-04 (1934) (current ver-
sion at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976». Section 605 provides in part: 
Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person 
receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in 
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire 
or radio ehall divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through au-
thorized channels of transmission or reception, (1) to any per-
son,other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, (2) to a 
person employed or authorized to forward such communica-
tion to its destination . . . . No person not being authorized 
by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and di-
vulge or publisb the existence, contents, substance, purport, 
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any 
person. No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or 
assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by 
radio and use such communication (or any information therein 
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not 
entitled thereto. No person having received any intercepted 
radio communication or having become acquainted with the 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such com-
munication (or any part thereof) knowing that such communi-
cation was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such com-
munication (or any part thereof) or use such communication 
(or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or 
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section 
shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or 
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tion and divulgence of STY programming, the court raised a 
protective umbrella over the STY industry. As new video sys-
tems emerge, however, the difficulties of operating under legisla-
tion which stems from the 1934 Communications Act will be-
come more severe. Because the language of the Act is outmoded, 
it no longer corresponds to contemporary communications tech-
nology and courts, like the Ninth Circuit, must continually rein-
terpret its provisions. This Note will examine the court's reason-
ing, compare its decision to those of other courts, and ultimately 
conclude that either Congress or the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) should provide protection for the STY 
industry. 
B. FACTS 
National Subscription Television (NST) transmits an en-
coded visual signal which ordinary television sets receive in 
scrambled form. 8 To obtain intelligible visual and aural signals, 
subscribers must lease special decoding devices from NST.f The 
decoders enable NST to determine audience program prefer-
ences and to generate monthly subscription bills. II 
Defendants manufactured and distributed decoding devices, 
unauthorized by NST, which were capable of unscrambling 
NST's signals. II Consequently, purchasers of defendants' decod-
broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of 
the general public, or which relates to ships in distress. 
47 u.s.c. § 605 (1976) (emphasis added). 
3. The FCC promulgated specific rules to regulate STV operations. See 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 73.641-.644 (1980). NST leased transmission facilities daily from plaintiff Oak Broad-
casting Systems, Inc. for a specified number of hours. Oak is licensed to broadcast tele-
vision signals over a UHF channel. 
4. 644 F.2d at 821. FCC regulations require that STV operators lease decoders to 
subscribers. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(C)(3) (1980). The FCC adopted the leasing requirement to 
protect the public from the technical obsolescence of equipment and to give customers 
greater fiexibility in changing syste~s. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television 
Service Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 552 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 
Fourth Report and Order). 
In Fourth Report and Order, the FCC determined that the adoption of a single Bub-
scription television technical system would stifie inventiveness and the incentive to cre-
ate new STY systems. Id. at 535. Because the FCC established lltandards which ensured 
the transmission of satisfactory pictures and sounds, the Commission concluded that the 
marketplace should be the proving ground of competing STV systems. Id. at 536. 
5. 644 F.2d at 821. 
6.Id. 
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ers received NST's programming free of any subscription fees. 
In reversing the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for 
damages and injunctive relief, the Ninth Circuit held that sec-
tion 605 protects over-the-air subscription television against in-
terception and divulgence.7 
C. BACKGROUND 
Legislative History 
Section 605 protects radio communications against unautho-
rized publication and divulgence.8 The scope of protection af-
forded by section 605 is limited, however, by the following pro-
viso: "This section shall not apply to the receiving, publishing, 
or utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is 
broadcast or tr~smitted by amateurs or others for. the use of 
the general public .... "8 Thus, it is important to determine 
what type of communications fall within the meaning of the pro-
. viso because they are not protected under the Act. 
The first statutory restraint on disclosure of radio trans-
missions appeared in the Radio Act of 1912.10 In 1924, a bill 
introduced in the House of Representatives contained a confi-
dentiality provision with a caveat similar to that in the present 
section 605.11 A similar proviso surfaced in different bills of 
7. Id. at 826. 
8. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). "Radio communication," defined in § 153(b), includes the 
transmission by radio of signals, pictures .and sounds of all kinds. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) 
(1976). Section 60S, therefore, protects television communications. See also Allen B. Du-
Mont Laboratories v. Carrol, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 
(1951). 
In addition, a private right of action has been recognized under § 605. See Chartwell 
Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 466 n.5 (6th Cir. 1980); Reitmeister 
v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 
474 F. Supp. 672, 681 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
Section 605 also protects intrastate as well as interstate communications. See Be-
nanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 
(1939) . 
9. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). For relevant text of § 605 prior to this proviso, see note 4 
supra. 
10. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, §§ 1,4,37 Stat. 302 (1912). Regulation 19 of the Act 
provided in pertinent part: "No person or persons engaged in or having knowledge of the 
operation of any station or stations, shall divulge or publish the contents of any messages 
transmitted or received by such station, except to the person or persons to whom the 
same may be directed .... n Id. 37 Stat. at 307. 
11. H.R. 7357, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1924). Section 12 provided, "this section 
shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing of the contents of any 
3
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192412 and 192513 which were never enacted. 
The Radio Act of 1927 codified the proviso in section 27, its 
confidentiality provision. 1. Congressional reports indicate that 
section 27 was based upon existing law.u 
During the debate on the 1927 Act, Senator Pittman 
remarked: 
This language [of section 27] does not limit such 
message to one of a prior personal nature, and 
therefore must apply to all messages. The lan-
guage in its uncertainty is dangerous. . . . It 
might be construed to prevent the interception 
and publication of a speech by the President of 
the United States sent by one radio corporation 
to another radio corporation. I ' 
The proponents of the bill did not respond to Senator Pittman's 
interpretation of the section, and the conference bill passed 
without further amendment. Because Senator Pittman did not 
radio conversation transmitted for the use of the general public .... " Hearings Before 
the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 7357 to Regulate Radio 
Communication, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924). 
12. S. 2930, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). A report issued by the Committee on the 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries concerning S. 2930 pronounced: 
Section 16 of the bill is designed to secure secrecy in messages. 
There has been much complaint that unauthorized persons 
have intercepted messages and have made improper use of the 
information contained therein. It is provided that the section 
shall not apply to the receiving or utilizing the contents of ra-
dio communications transmitted by amateurs or others for the 
use of the general public or relating to ships in distress. 
H.R. REP. No. 719, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924). 
13. The same provisional language appeared in a 1925 bill, H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 14 (1925). 
14. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 27, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Section 27 states in part: 
"[Tlhis section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the 
contents of any radio communication broadcasted or transmitted by amateurs or others 
for the use of the general public .... " 
15. The 1926 Senate report stated: "The provisions regarding the protection of ship 
signals and messages against reception and use by unauthorized persons are largely 8 
redrsCt of existing law and seem necessary and proper provisions." S. REP. No. 772, 69th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926). 
The House report provided: "The bill also seeks to protect messages and the COD-
tents thereof against reception and use by unauthorized persons. The section is 8 redrsCt 
of a provision of existing law. It seems to the Committee a proper and necessary provi-
sion." H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926). 
16. 68 CONG REC. 4109 (1927). 
4
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mention the proviso to section 27, however, his remarks have 
limited value in unraveling the precise meaning of the entire 
section. 1" 
17. The senate debates on the passage of the 1927 Act also reveal that senate mem-
bers contemplated subscription broadcast services. 
Mr. DILL. Yes, Mr. President; I understand there are in-
ventions for broadcasting that would make it necessary for the 
person who listens to the program produced by that station to 
pay a charge in the form of having an attachment that would 
enable him to receive that particular broadcasting. 
Mr. COPELAND. That means that by a little conspiracy 
on the part of the licensees and the patentees of various de-
vices the wave lengths could be arranged in such a way, or the 
transmission be so made, that only this particular invention 
could be used to receive it. 
Mr. DILL. Mr. President, in the first place, the commis-
sion has power to prevent any such invention being put on any 
transmitting apparatus if it sees fit to do so. I do not know 
why the commission should prevent it, because if any broad-
caster wanta so to limit his listening public to those who have 
bought the attachment, while the other broadcasters allow 
everybody to listen, that is his privilege. I do not know that we 
want to prevent men in this country from going into the pri-
vate business of furnishing radio programs any more than fur-
nishing private programs of some other kind. 
Mr. WALSH of Montana. Pardon me. So, likewise, if a 
man had a particular line of goods that he wanted to adver-
tise, he would not go to a corporation that sent out his impres-
sions only to a limited number of people; he would go the gen-
eral broadcasting station. On the other hand, some people 
would like to get their impressions, so that they would not be 
altogether public, and they would care to subscribe to the 
broadcasting arrangement that would reach only a limited au-
dience. I can not understand why anybody should want to pre-
vent anybody who cares to do so from putting in use this 
invention. 
68 CONGo Rsc. 3033 (1927). 
Although Senator Dill indicated that subscription services should be allowed, he did 
not specifically assert that such communications would be protected from interception. 
Furthermore, according to Senator Dill, the Communications Commission would have 
authority under the bill to permit or prohibit subscription broadcast services. The Sena-
tor's remarks, therefore, only suggest that subscription broadcast services were protected 
from divulgence under the bill. 
The history and purposes of the Radio Act of 1927 are discussed in 27 COLUM. L. 
REv. 726 (1927). For an interesting discussion of the Radio Act of 1927 as it concerns the 
protection of transmissions against interception, reproduction and rebroadcast under the 
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In 1934, Congress revised the Communications Act18 and 
created the Communications Commission to regulate and super-
vise the industry. II Otherwise, the Act did not substantially alter 
existing legislation/~o Moreover, both the Senate and House com-
mittee reports announced that the confidentiality provision 
found in section 605 of the 1934 Act was "based upon section 27 
of the Radio Act [of 1927]" although its application was ex-
tended to wire communications.11 
In 1968, as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, Congress further amended section 605.11 As 
amended, section 605 superceded its predecessor, but the Senate 
committee report stated: "The section [605] is not intended to 
apply to radio broadcasts or transmission by amateurs or others 
for the use of the general public .... "18 An examination of the 
legislative history of section 605, therefore, provides little gui-
dance in determining the reach of the proviso. 
Judicial Interpretations of Section 605 
In 1967, the courts first addressed the relationship between 
section 605 and subscription broadcast services. In KMLA 
Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors Corp.,I. 
plaintiffs transmitted a background music program to subscrib-
ers over a subcarrier frequency, entitled a mUltiplex channe"'· 
18. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
19. Creation of the Commission unified the control of the various agencies con-
cerned with interstate and foreign communications. Previously, jurisdiction over common 
carriers was held by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The executive branch as-
signed frequencies for government radio stations. The Department of Commerce licensed 
station operators, and the Federal Radio Commission, created by the Radio Act of 1927, 
regulated radio communications. See generally 21 VA. L. REv. 318 (1935). 
20. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940). 
21. H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 11 (1934). 
22. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1968). 
23. ld. at lOS. 
24. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
25. ld. at 37. KMLA was licensed under a Subsidiary Communications Authoriza-
tion to transmit a subscription background music service on a separate, subcarrier fre7 
quency. Multiplexing is the simultaneous transmission of broadcasting over a FM sta-
tion's main frequency and a background music program to subscribers over its multiplex 
channel. [d. 
Currently, an FM broadcast licensee must apply for a Subsidiary Communications 
Authorization (SCA) to provide limited types of subsidiary services. 47 C.F.R. § 73.293 
(1980). 
6
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Because ordinary radio receivers could not pick up the fre-
quency, plaintiffs provided each subscriber with a special multi-
plex receiver. Defendants, without authorization from the plain-
tiffs, installed multiplex tuners capable of receiving KMLA's 
background music in numerous business establishments. 
The KMLA court stated that "[t]he question of whether 
KMLA's multiplex transmissions over its subcarrier frequency 
constitute 'broadcasting' so as to make the protections of section 
605 inapplicable because of the proviso . . . hinges on whether 
KMLA intended a dissemination of its multiplex radio commu-
nications to the general public. "S8 Because the nature of the ser-
vice negated any intention that the transmission be received by 
the public, the KMLA court determined that multiplexing was 
not broadcasting.s" The controlling factors in this determination 
were the use of special receiving equipment (i.e. the technical 
inability of ordinary sets to receive the transmission)·' and the 
composition of the service directed to the specific needs of in-
dustrial and commercial institutions.·' 
26. 264 F. Supp. at 40 (footnote omitted). 
27. Id. at 42. The statutory definition of broadcasting is "the dissemination of radio 
communications intended to be received by the public .... " 47 U.S.C. § 153(0) (1976). 
In the 1930's, the FCC interpreted broadcasting as the dissemination of communications 
to the general public. According to the FCC, transmissions to specific listeners were 
point-to-point communications not authorized by a broadcast license. See In re Adelaide 
Lillian CarreU, 7 F.C.C. 219 (1939) (delivering messages in cooperation with local police 
was contrary to terms of station license because transmissions were of individual 
messages); In re Bremer Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 79 (1935) (coded horse racing results 
contrary to broadcasting license which authorized disseminations to the general public); 
In re Application of Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935) (alleged doctor answering 
questions and giving advice was point-to-point or individual communication). 
28. 264 F. Supp. at 42. Limited access to a signal is only one element in determining 
the sender's intent to reach the public. The courts have also protected transmissions 
with extensive public access. See United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955) 
(private radio communications over a licensed farm radio station protected under § 605 
once operators were licensed, even though anyone might hear them); Reston v. FCC, 492 
F. Supp. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (FCC need not release recordings of transmissions between 
amateur radio stations because § 605 demanded nondisclosure); United States v. Fuller, 
202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (police and fire agency radio messages, receivable on 
any short wave radio, were private transmissions protected by § 605). 
29. 264 F. Supp. at 42. One writer suggests that the KMLA court focused upon the 
subscribers' needs rather than the nonsubscribing public's taste, which might be the 
same. The public would probably be extremely interested in the uninterrupted music 
that KMLA's subscribers received. Program content, therefore, should not be determina-
tive of the transmitter's broadcasting intent. Note, Federal Communications Law and 
Unfair Competition: Clearing Up Some Static for Pay TV and Radio: Unauthorized 
Reception of Nonbroadcast Radio Communications, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 526 (1968). 
7
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The court concluded that multiplexing was directed to and 
received by subscribers alone.ao Therefore, because KMLA's 
transmissions were not broadcast as defined by the Act, the 
KMLA court ruled that section 605 protected the plaintiffs. al 
The court also noted that FCC regulations for multiplexing and 
regular broadcast services differed substantially. 81 
The KMLA court relied in part on Functional Music, Inc. v. 
FCC,aa the leading case on the distinction between broadcast 
and non-broadcast communications under section 3(0) of the 
Act.84 In Functional Music, an FM broadcasting station used a 
simplex system to superimpose a subscription music service on 
its traditional broadcasting operation. Subscribers received the 
station's regular broadcasts free of advertisements.ao 
In ruling that simplexing was broadcasting, the Functional 
Music court declared that neither the presentation of a highly 
specialized format nor the charging of a fee for communications 
services was dispositive of one's intent or status as a broad-
caster.ae The court announced that "[b]roadcasting remains 
broadcasting even though a segment of those capable of receiv-
ing the broadcast signal are equipped to delete a portion of that 
signal. . . . [F]unctional programming can be, and is, of interest 
to the general radio audience. "a7 
Furthermore, the court found that Functional's program-
ming was designed to reach both subscribers and non-subscrib-
ers. a8 Thus, in both KMLA and Functional Music, the courts, in 
determining whether the transmissions constituted broadcasting, 
30. 264 F. Supp. at 42. 
31. Id. 
32.Id. 
33. 274 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1969). 
34. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 662, § 3(0), 48 Stat. 1066 (1934) (current ver-
son at 47 U.S.C. § 163(0) (1976». 
36. 274 F.2d at 644. With a simplex system, the broadcaster transmitted a auper-
sonic signal which caused the special equipment in the subscribers' receivers to momen-
tarily disconnect the broadcast signal. Simplexing involves the emission of one FM signal 
over each allocated FM channel. Subscription music services, therefore, emitted a single 
signal received by both subscribers and the non-subscribing public. Subscribers, how-
ever, could delete a portion of the transmission with special receiving equipment. Id. at 
646 n.4. 
36. Id. at 648. 
37. Id. at 648-49. 
38. Id. at 648. 
8
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looked to whether or not the transmitter intended that the pub-
lic receive its signals. 
In 1979, a New York district court, in Orth-O- Vision, Inc. v. 
Home Box Of/iceS9 also relied upon Functional Music to deny 
Home Box Office's (HBO) motion for summary judgment on its 
Federal Communications Act claim. In Orth-O-Vision, HBO 
sought summary judgment and a permanent injunction under 
section 605 when Orth-O-Vision intercepted HBO's signals with-
out authorization. 
The court queried whether Clthe converse of the rule in 
Functional Music is also true: does the transmission of program-
ming which is of interest to the general public constitute 'broad-
casting' even though one cannot view the programs without pay-
ing a fee for special equipment?"40 In reaching an affirmative 
answer, the court reviewed the FCC's ruling that over-the-air 
subscription television constituted broadcasting. According to 
the FCC: 
The evident intention of any station transmitting 
subscription programs would be to make them 
available to all members of the public within 
range of the station . . . . [T)he primary touch-
stone of a broadcast service is the intent of the 
broadcaster to· provide radio or television service 
without discrimination to as many members of 
the general public as can be interested in the par-
ticular program.41 
The Orth-O-Vision court observed that HBO had not dis-
tinguished its multipoint distribution service (MDS) transmis-
sions from those of STV systems.41 Because both systems ap-
39. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
40. Id. at 681-82. 
41. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Radio 
Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry [hereinafter cited as Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry), 3 F.C.C.2d I, 9 (1966). 
42. 474 F. Supp. at 682. The FCC authorized MDS broadcasting in 1962 by allocat-
ing certain microwave frequencies, 2150-2162 megaHertz, to be used in common carrier 
service. 47 C.F.R. § 21.901(a) (1980). An MDS operator transmits a signal which is trans-
lated into a visual picture by the receiver. An MOS system involves the transmission of 
signals by a fixed station on a microwave frequency towards numerous fixed MDS receiv-
ers. A special receiver is required to pick up the signal because it is transmitted on a 
microwave frequency. A television outfitted with the receiver will direct frequencies onto 
9
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pealed to a mass audience and technically were capable of 
reaching the general public, the court concluded that such trans-
missions constituted broadcasting and, therefore, were exempt 
from section 605 protection. U Thus, the Orth-O-Vision court 
viewed mass appeal and the technological capability to reach the 
general public as indicative of a transmitter's broadcasting 
intent. 
In Home Box Office, Inc. u. Pay TV of Greater New York," 
defendant retransmitted HBO's subscription television program-
ming without authorization. Defendant claimed that plaintiff 
had consented to defendant's interception and was guilty of . 
laches, but failed to claim that the signals were unprotected, or 
fell within the proviso. The HBO court remarked in dictum that 
because HBO transmitted to some affiliates by an MDS" it had 
not manifested any intention that the general public receive its 
programming and should be afforded section 605 protection.'· 
Until 1980, courts attempting to determine whether section 
605 protected subscription broadcast services looked to the defi-
nition of broadcasting''' to resolve the issue. Thus, transmissions 
that constituted broadcasting pursuant to section 153(0) fell 
within the proviso to section 605 and were, therefore, unpro-
tected." Conversely, transmissions that did not constitute 
broadcasting avoided the reach of the proviso and were pro-
tected by section 605." 
In the recent case of Chartwell Communications Group v. 
an unoccupied channel. 
MDS and STV are technologically dissimilar, and the court's analysis was probably 
inapt. Although the court rejected HBO's § 605 claim, it ~anted HBO partial summary 
judgment and a permanent injunction on its copyright claim. 474 F. Supp. at 687. 
For an excellent introduction into various video systems employed today, see The 
Development 0/ Video Technology, 25 N.Y.L.S.L. REv. 789 (1980). 
43. 474 F. Supp. at 682. 
44. 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
45. For a discussion of MDS broadcasting, see note 42 supra. 
46. 467 F. Supp. at 528. 
47. 47 U.S.C. § 153(0) (1976). 
48. See Orth·O·Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 680·81 (S.D. N.Y. 
1979). 
49. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 
528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors 
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 41·42 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
10
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Westbrook,IIO the operator of an over-the-air subscription televi-
sion service raised section 605 protection to enjoin defendants 
from selling electronic decoders that enabled non-subscribers to 
receive plaintiffs' signals. The Chartwell court held that STY 
was not broadcasting intended for the use of the general public 
within the meaning of the proviso. 111 The court distinguished 
"between making a service available to the general public and 
intending a program for the use of the general public," and 
found that the "dual nature of STY is that while it may be 
available to the general public, it is intended for the exclusive 
use of paying subscribers. "III 
The Chartwell court noted that a recent staff report of the 
FCC's Office of Plans and Policyll8 questioned the wisdom of 
classifying STY as broadcasting for section 605 purposes.1I4 The 
court concluded that, under the proviso to section 605, the de-
termination of which communications constitute broadcasting 
depends upon whether the transmission was intended for gen-
eral public use.1III Although the Chartwell court acknowledged 
that mass appeal and mass availability are factors in making 
that determination, it held that those factors could be negated 
by objective evidence. III 
The court held that STY's method of sending scrambled 
signals, unintelligible without a decoder, provided objective evi-
dence that STY was not intended for public use.1I7 Furthermore, 
the Chartwell court found no meaningful distinction between 
the communications protected in KMLA and STY transmis-
sions. Both required special equipment in order to produce an 
intelligible signal. liB 
Thus, the Chartwell court interpreted "broadcasting," for 
section 605 purposes, to require an examination of the intent to 
50. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980). 
51. ld. at 465. 
52. ld. 
53. FCC OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, POLICIES FOR REGULATION OF DIRECT BROAD-
CAST SATELLITES (1980) [hereinafter cited as DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES]. 
54. ld. at 124 n.17. 
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transmit for the use of the public, rather than the intent to be 
received by the public. 
D. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In National Subscription Television, defendants claimed 
that program appeal and signal delivery capability determined 
whether a transmission is section 153(0) broadcasting, and that 
section 153(0) broadcasting should be excluded from section 605 
protection by virtue of the proviso. The Ninth Circuit, however, 
concluded that section 153(0) did not control the reach of the 
proviso. lie 
After considering prior case law, the Ninth Circuit decided 
not to follow past decisions which coupled section 153(0) broad-
casting with the proviso to section 605.80 Therefore, the court 
rejected the analytical framework adopted in Orth-O-Vision, 
whereby broadcasting as defined by section 153(0) was unpro-
tected because it fell within the proviso to section 605.81 
In ruling that section 605 protected STV, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished broadcasting from use.81 Because section 605 does 
not apply to any radio communication broadcast or transmitted 
for the use of the general public, the court reasoned that "an 
individual might 'broadcast'-i.e. transmit a signal over the air-
waves with the intent that it be received by the public within 
the meaning of section 153(0)-without such broadcasting being 
for the use of the public within the meaning of the proviso."8s 
The court recognized that NST designed its programming 
to attract a mass audience and offered it to any member of the 
public willing to pay the subscription price." The Ninth Circuit 
opined, however, that NST's transmission of scrambled signals 
demonstrated its intent that only paying subscribers could use 
the broadcast.811 
59. 644 F.2d at 823-24. 
60. ld. at 822-24. 
61. Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. at 682. 
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Although the Ninth Circuit did not adhere to the Chartwell 
court's reinterpretation of the term broadcasting for section 605 
purposes, it accepted the Chartwell court's premise that STV 
signals were not broadcast for the public use. The court also re-
jected defendants' argument that the phrase "for the use of gen-
eral public" in the proviso modifies the word "transmitted," and 
that "broadcast" stands alone.·· The Ninth Circuit ruled, there-
fore, that section 605 protected NST's signals." 
. Another critical factor in the court's decision was the FCC 
determination that over-the-air STY promotes the public inter-
est because it is an alt~rnative communications system which in-
creases the diversification of service and choice of programs." 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the defendants' activities 
threatened the economic viability of NST, in that purchasers of 
defendants' decoders received NST's programming without pay-
ing any subscription fees. This loss of revenue, the court rea-
soned, prompted less attractive programming and discouraged 
capital investment in the STY industry.·· 
Furthermore, the court stated that defendants' sale of de-
coding devices contravened the FCC's consumer protection pol-
icy which requires STV operators to lease decoders.tO Thus, in 
finding that section 605 protected STY programming, the court 
believed that its decision supported express FCC policies en-
couraging the development of over-the-air STY operations. 
E. ANALYSIS 
Availability and Use 
The Communications Act specifically mandates the FCC to 
"[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of fre-
quencies, and generally encourage the larger and more effective 
use of radio in the public interest. . . ."71 In light of this man-
date, the Ninth Circuit's decision ostensibly embraces the spirit 
of the Act by ensuring the continued viability of STY service. 
66. Id. at S25. 
67. Id. at 826. 
68. Id. at 825. See Fourth Report and Order, supra note 4, at 586. 
69. 644 F.2d at 825. 
70. Id. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(0(3) (1980). 
71. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976). 
13
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The success of over-the-air STY depends upon limiting its re-
ception to subscribers. In National Subscription Television v. 
S & H TV,72 the Ninth Circuit guaranteed an STY operator 
limited access. 
One must recall, however, that the Communications Act, '> 
based substantially on the Radio Act of 1927, emerged in 193478 
when over-the-air STY, cable TV services and satellite commu-
nications were non-existent and unforeseeable. Because they 
must reinterpret this outdated Act to fit contemporary needs, 
the federal courts have inconsistently applied its provisions, and 
will continue to do so until Congress intervenes. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's declination to follow prior 
case law and its great concern over STY's commercial survival 
suggest that the court's analysis in National Subscription Tele-
vision was result oriented. The Ninth Circuit based its interpre-
tation of section 605 upon a technical evaluation of statutory 
language. Dissecting the phrase ubroadcast or transmitted for 
the use of the general public" in the proviso,7' the court focused 
its attention on the difference between broadcasting (under sec-
tion 153(0), the intent to be received by the public)711 and use. 
The court thus affirmed the proposition announced in Chartwell 
Communications Group v. Westbrook'S that public availability 
and use are separate concepts. 
This distinction, however, is negligible in the context of ra-
dio and television communications. A signal broadcast over pub-
lic airwaves will be used by the public, unless the signal exists in 
a vacuum." Moreover, STY operators transmit signals over tele-
vision broadcast frequencies received by all ordinary television 
sets in the reception area. Therefore, the public has unrestricted 
72. 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981). 
73. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
74. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). 
75. 1d. § 153(0). 
76. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980). 
77. We recognize in the criminal context, for example, that a conversation between 
two people in public negates any expectation of privacy in that communication. See Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although the parties may speak in code or in a 
foreign language, a passerby who overhears the conversation may certainly "use" it. We 
would not prohibit the passerby from decoding the communication, or from using a dic-
tionary to aide in translating it. Similarly, a signal broadcast over the public airwaves 
will be used by the public. until the legislature limits its reception to specific individuals. 
14
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access to the signal. 
In National Subscription Television the court declared that 
although STY is broadcasting, it is not intended for the public's 
use because the transmitted signal is unintelligible without a de-
coder.'s The court in KMLA, however, held that radio transmis-
sions which could not be heard without special receiving equip-
ment were not broadcast within the meaning of section 153(0).'8 
The contents of the programs and the necessity of special equip-
ment to receive them led the KMLA court to conclude that the 
transmissions were not intended to be received by the public.sO 
The nature of STY service similarly negates any intent for 
public reception. Although STY operators offer a product to the 
general public, their service is intended to reach only those 
members of the public willing to pay a fee.sl Therefore, a re-
examination of STY's status as broadcasting is appropriate. 
The Ninth Circuit probably could have relied on KMLA to 
find that STV is not broadcasting.81 In doing so, the court's 
analysis of section 605 would have been consistent with prior 
case law which looked to the definition of broadcasting in deter-
mining the reach of the proviso.sa Furthermore, such a decision 
would have provided section 605 protection for STV." 
The court may have feared, however, that a reclassification 
of STV as a non-broadcast service would prove too much. The 
FCC determined that STY is broadcasting when it authorized 
the service on channels assigned to television broadcasting.slI A 
ruling that STY does not constitute broadcasting, therefore, 
78. 644 F.2d at 824 (citing Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 
F.2d 459, 465·67 (6th Cir. 19SO». 
79. 264 F. Supp. at 42. 
SO.ld. 
81. DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES, supra note 53. 
82. For a discussion of KMLA, see notes 24·32 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See Orth·O·Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672,680·81 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 528 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 
264 F. Supp. 35, 41·42 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
84. See KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. 
Supp. 35, 42 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
16 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
might implicate the FCC's authorization of STV8s and could al-
ter the nature of the FCC's jurisdiction over the service.87 
86. Statements made by the FCC in 1957 indicate that the Commission did not view 
its determination of whether STV constituted broadcasting as controlling the authoriza-
tion of the service on traditional broadcast frequencies. According to the FCC: 
There is no question as to the Commission's authority to au-
thorize the use of radio frequencies for numerous kinds of ser-
vices which are neither broadcast services nor common carrier 
services. The safety and special radio services abound in ex-
amples, including the use of radio for aviation and marine 
navigation, and by industrial firms, fire and police depart-
ments, taxis, and many other non broadcast users. 
Nor, in our opinion, does the fact that selected frequen-
cies have been allocated primarily for broadcast uses bar our 
authorization of the use of such frequencies for non broadcast 
purposes. Thus, as we have already stated, we believe that the 
question of whether subscription television as proposed on 
this record is or is not properly classifiable as "broadcasting" 
under the definition in section 3(0) of the Communications 
Act is not controlling as to whether the Commission has the 
statutory power to authorize the use of television channels for 
a subscription TV service. 
In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
(Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service First Report. 
23 F.C.C.2d 532, 541 (1975). 
When the FCC authorized STV, however, it concluded that the service did consti-
tute broadcasting. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, supra 
note 41, at 8-11. Based on the Commission's findings, the court in National Ass'n of 
Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 
(1970), affirmed the FCC's authorization of national over-the·air STV on a permanent 
basis. Thus, the FCC's authority to allocate broadcast frequencies to non-broadcast ser-
vices may still be questioned. 
87. The Court, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), 
ruled that the FCC's jurisdiction over cable, a non-broadcast service, was "restricted to 
that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." Id. at 178. 
The reclassification of STY as a non-broadcast service might similarly restrict the 
FCC's jurisdiction over STV. Recently, however, the FCC has repealed many of its regu-
lations concerning STY. See In re Repeal of Programming Restrictions on Subscription 
Television Report and Order, 42 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1207 (1978) (repealing restrictions 
on STY presentation of sports and commercial advertising); In re Repeal of Movie Re-
strictions on Subscription Television Report and Order, 41 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1491 
(1977) (repealing regulations restricting the presentation of feature films on STV); Radio 
Broadcast SerVices, Amending Rules Regarding the Subscription Television Service, 44 
Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,095 (1979) (repealing one-to-a-community rule). 
Furthermore, the Commission is currently treating cable and STV equally because it 
recognizes that both services are directly competitive. In re Repeal of Movie Restrictions 
on Subscription Television Report and Order, 41 HAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1491, 1493 
(1977). 
A reclassification of STY as a non-broadcast or hybrid service at this time, therefore, 
would not impinge on the FCC's jurisdiction over the service. A problem might arise in 
the future if the FCC wanted to enact additional regulations over STY as a broadcasting 
16
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FCC Interpretation of Broadcasting 
Although the FCC ruled that STV is broadcasting, it was 
not required to do so. There are historical precedents which in-
dicate that the FCC could have classified STV as a non-broad-
cast or hybrid service, and as such, STV would probably have 
been protected under section 605. 
During the 1930's, the FCC differentiated between broad-
casting and fixed or point-to-point communications. Broad-
casting generally encompassed unaddressed, universally dis-
seminated transmissions, while fixed or point-to-point 
communications were those addressed to a specific person or re-
ception point.88 The FCC emphasized that under the terms of 
their licenses, stations could transmit standard broadcast ser-
vices of general interest to the public, although point-to-point 
communications were disallowed.88 
In 1941, the FCC concluded that a subscription radio ser-
vice was broadcasting, and authorized its operation on an experi-
mental basis.80 Thereafter, the Commission removed subscrip-
service. This seems highly unlikely, however, because additional regulations would place 
STV at a severe disadvantage to competitors such as cable and MOS. 
88. In re Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939); In re Bremer Broadcast-
ing Co., 2 F.C.C. 79 (1935); In re Application of Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 
(1935). See note 27 supra. 
89. See cases cited in note 88 supra. 
90. In re Muzak Corp., 8 F.C.C. 581 (1941). The Commission noted that "[tlhe ser-
vice ... will be available to the general public; any member of the public, without dis-
crimination, may lease the equipment to receive the service." Id. at 582. 
The FCC's decision to authorize a subscription service over the broadcast band gen-
erated commenta in the Congress. The 1952 House debates on S. 658 included these 
remarks: 
It will be remembered that the decision in the Muzak 
case was a memorandum decision on an application for an ex-
perimentallicense, and that the authorization was issued upon 
the express understanding that it did not constitute a finding 
by the Commission that the operation authorized would be in 
the public interest beyond the express terms of the grant . 
. . . [Ilt is my intention, if no one else does, to introduce 
a bill which will provide for a further definition of "broadcast-
ing." I have certain ideas on that which would not include 
subscription television or Bubscription radio as broadcasting 
but probably provide for classification of such service as a 
common carrier or contract service of some sort. I think it 
should not be classified in the broadcast field as the Commis-
sion has said in the Muzak case that it could be. 
17
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tion music services from standard broadcast frequencies by 
establishing multiplexing regulations.·1 The FCC recognized that 
subscription FM radio services were hybrid communications, 
combining characteristics of both broadcasting and point-to-
point services.91 Furthermore, both the courts and the Commis-
sion have concluded that the point-to-point or non-broadcast 
characteristics of radio and video (i.e. MDS) subscription ser-
vices bring them within the scope of section 605 protections 
against unauthorized interception and publication." 
STY as Broadcasting 
The FCC struggled with its determination that over-the-air 
STY was broadcasting under section 153(0). The FCC instituted 
proceedings in 1955 to formulate regulations of STV. In 1966, 
the Commission ruled that STY could properly be transmitted 
by an FCC broadcasting licensee because it was broadcasting 
under section 153(0).94 Over-the-air subscription television was 
not authorized on a permanent and national basis, however, un-
til 1968.·a 
98 CONGo REC. 9032, 9033 (1952) (remarks of Rep. Hinshaw). The statutory definition of 
broadcasting was never altered. 
91. The court in Functional Music, Inc. V. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959), reversed the FCC's decision that subscription music 
services on a simplex basis were not broadcasting. The FCC 8ubaequently prohibited 
simplexing because the contractual nature of the service could inhibit the licensee from 
controlling program selection and responding to public needs. See In re Amendment of 
Part 73-Radio Broadcast Services-to proscribe the "simplex" transmission of 8ub-
scriber background music by FM Broadcast Stations, and to make related changes Re-
port and Order, 2 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1683, 1685·86 (1964). 
92. In re Application of WFTL Broadcasting Co., 45 F.C.C.2d 1152, 1153-54 (1974); 
In re Amendment of Section 73.202(b), 61 F.C.C.2d 113, 117 (1976). 
The Commission now requires subscription radio operators to transmit program-
ming that is broadcast-related, even though the programming may be of interest prima-
rily to limited segments of the public. 47 C.F.R. § 73.293(a)(l) (1980). 
Conversely, because subscription radio services are not bona fide broadcast opera-
tions, the Commission may exempt an operator from statutory provisions applicable to 
broadcast stations. See In re Request by Greater Washington Educational Telecommuni-
cations Assoc., Int., 49 F.C.C.2d 948 (1974) (fairneBS doctrine, §§ 315, 399(a) not ex-
tended to a specialized informational subscription radio service for the blind). 
93. See Home Box Office, Inc. V. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 
528 (E.n.N.Y. 1979); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. V. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors, 264 
F. Supp. 35, 42 (C.D. Cal. 1967); In re Application of WFTL Broadcasting Co., 45 
F.C.C.2d 1152, 1154 (1974). 
94. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, supra note 41. 
95. Fourth Order and Report, supra note 4. The rules promulgated in the report 
and the FCC's authorization of national over-the-air subscription television were af-
firmed in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners V. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/4
1982] COMMUNICATIONS LAW 19 
The FCC has not specifically ruled upon the relationship of 
section 605 and STY, although it recognized the problem in 
1966." At that time, the FCC noted, "section 605 prohibits the 
unauthorized publication of communications, but expressly ex-
empts 'the contents of any radio communication broadcast' from 
its application."" The Commission then invited comments as to 
whether it should recommend legislation to the Congress regard-
ing section 605 and other provisions of the Act." 
In 1980, a staff report of the FCC's Office of Plans and Pol-
icy" suggested that STV should be protected by section 605 be-
cause "there is no distinguishing factor that would justify the 
exclusion of STY programming, but not the subscription pro-
gramming by other licensees, from the protection afforded by 
Section 605."100 
The report also indicated that the FCC never formulated a 
distinction between subscription radio services which are desig-
nated hybrid communications, and STY which is termed broad-
casting.101 According to the report, a reclassification of STY as a 
hybrid service would not undermine the Commission's authori-
zation of STV on television broadcasting channels.lOI Implicitly, 
such a reclassification would also bring STY within the purview 
of section 605.108 The FCC, therefore, can take steps on its own 
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). One commentator implies that the Natioool Ass'n of Thea-
tre Owners court gave special deference to the FCC's resolutions about STY because 
Congress procrastinated in dealing with the problem. The court may have also acted out 
of exasperation due to the FCC's prolonged study of STY prior to its regulation of the 
service, coupled with a sense of duty to settle the important issues involved. See Com-
ment, Subscription Television, the FCC and the Courts, 15 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 283, 289 
(1970). For an analysis of the FCC's prolonged struggle with the regulation of STV, see 
Brown, The Subscription Television Controversy: A Continuing Symptom of Federal 
Communication Commission Ills, 24 FRD. COM. B.J. 259 (1970-71). 
11. 
96. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, supra note 41, at 
97.ld. 
98.ld. 
99. DlRBCT BROADCAST SATELLITES, supra note 53. 
100. Id. at 124 n.17. 
101. Id. at 124. 
102. Id. 
103. A reclassification of STY may be problematic from a technical standpoint. 
Multiplex systems and STY services are technically distinguishable, and subject to dif-
ferent regulations. Multiplexing, for example, is the simultaneous transmission of two or 
more signals within a single channel. 47 C.F.R. § 73.310(a) (1980). The subscription radio 
service, therefore, is a subsidiary of the broadcaster's main FM service. 47 C.F.R. § 
19
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to foster the protection of STY transmissions from interception 
and publication. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision, the scope of protection 
afforded by section 605 remains unclear. Legislative history pro-
vides little assistance in discerning the exact meaning of the pro-
viso or its relationship to subscription broadcast services. 
Prior to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Chartwell,l04 the fed-
eral courts looked to the definition of broadcasting under section 
153(0) in order to determine whether section 605 protected sub-
scription broadcast services. Only those transmissions that did 
not constitute section 153(0) broadcasting avoided the reach of 
the proviso and were protected by section 605.101 The Chart well 
court, however, redefined the meaning of broadcasting for sec-
tion 605 purposes. Thus, programming not intended for the pub-
lic use was protected.loe 
In National Subscription Television, the Ninth Circuit for-
mulated yet another interpretation of the proviso. The court 
concluded that the proviso to section 605 exempted section 
153(0) broadcasting only if the transmissions were for the public 
use.107 Because STV employs a scrambled signal which is 
unintelligible without a decoder, the Ninth Circuit held that 
STY is not broadcast for the public use and does not come 
within the proviso.I08 
73.294 (1980). Moreover, normal radio receivers do not pick up the subcarrier frequency. 
STY, on the other hand, involves transmissions over an allocated television broad-
cast channel which are receivable by all normal television sets. A reclassification of STY, 
therefore, would !Dean that non-broadcast or hybrid services were being transmitted over 
frequencies reserved for broadcasting. Yet, television broadcast licensees with FCC au-
thorization to provide subscription service must also broadcast minimum hours of non-
subscription programming, and the licensee is governed by the Commission's standard 
broadcast rules. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1980). Thus, under current regulations the public is 
guaranteed a certain number of non-subscription programming hours on every television 
broadcast channel. 
104. Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980). 
105. See KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. 20th Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 
F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
106. 637 F.2d at 465. 
107. 644 F.2d at 824. 
108. [d. 
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In the future, courts that deal with the relationship of sub-
scription broadcast services and section 605 will face inconsis-
tent analytical guidelines. The reach of the proviso, therefore, 
will depend upon the particular viewpoint adopted by each 
court. A careful delineation of the scope of protection afforded 
to contemporary communications services under section 605, or 
a specific sanction against interception of these services, must be 
prepared by Congress.1oe 
Congress responded to a judicial call for legislation in the 
copyright area with a general revision of the Copyright Act in 
1976.110 By ruling that section 605 protects STY operations, the 
109. In 1980, H.R. 7747 was introduced in the House. This bill would heve amended 
the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit the unauthorized interception and use of 
subscription telecommunications, and provided stiff civil and criminal penalties for a 
knowing interception. Subscription telecommunications were defined by the bill as "any 
telecommunication ... which is intended for receipt in intelligible form only by a per-
son who has agreed to pay a fee or charge to the person originating the telecommunica-
tion .... " H.R. 7747, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill, however, was never reported 
out of committee. 
An earlier bill, H.R. 3333, also addressed the issue. H.R. 3333 prohibited the inter-
ception of private communications which were defined as communications sent "with a 
reasonable expectation thet such communication is not subject to being intercepted . . . 
until such communication is received by the intended recipient." H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 
1st Seas. (1979). A hearing was held in the House on April 24, 1979, but the bill was 
never voted on. 
For an example of a specific sanction against interception, see CAL. PENAL CODB 
§ 593e (West Supp. 1981) which provides: 
Every person who for profit knowingly and willfully 
manufactures, distributes, or seDs any device or plan or kit for 
a device, or printed circuit containing circuitry for intercep-
tion or decoding with the purpose or intention of facilitating 
interception or decoding of any over-the-air transmission by a 
subscription television service made pursuant to authority 
granted by the Federal Communications Commission which is 
not authorized by the subscription television service is guilty 
of a misdemeanor punisheble by a fine not exceeding two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or by imprisonment in 
the county jail not exceeding 90 days, or both. 
110. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). Copyright problems developed when cable 
operaton began to carry television signals from distant markets to subscribers without 
authorization from the originator of the broadcasts. The Supreme Court ruled that cable 
operaton did not violate the Copyright Act, because cable systems did not "perform" the 
distant signals thet they transmitted. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); United Artist Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 392 
U.S. 390 (1968). 
In 1976, Congress revised the Copyright Act, and section 111 of the Act now pro-
vides a compulsory license for cable systems upon payment of a specified percentage of 
revenues for retransmission of distant non-network programs. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). 
21
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Ninth Circuit may have diverted congressional attention from a 
segment of the Communications Act which desperately needs 
it. 111 
Moreover, the court's decision leaves a number of unan-
swered questions. Are video services such as cable and MDS au-
tomatically protected by section 605 because they do not utilize 
television broadcast frequencies, or must the courts determine 
the programmer's intent to transmit for the public use? How are 
communications sent by direct broadcast satellites (which indis-
criminately transmit both pay and nonpay programming)11I af-
fected by the court's decision? In determining whether program-
ming is broadcast for the use of the general public which, if any, 
of the following factors is critical-a scrambled signal, special 
receiving equipment, the charging of a fee or the technical 
method of transmission? Are individuals who construct decoders 
at home for private use guilty of violating section 605? 
111. Senate bill 898, which comprehensively amends the CommunIcations Act, 
passed in the Senate on October 7, 1981. The relationship of subscription broadcast ser-
vices to § 605, however, has not been clarified by the language of the bill. Section 605 
remains unchanged, except for the substitution of the word interexchange for interstate. 
S. REP. No. 97-170, 97th Cong., 1st SeBS. 146 (1981). 
Another bill has been introduced in the House, however, which further amends 
§ 605. H.R. 4727 leaves the language of § 605 intact, but adds substantial civil and crimi-
nal penalties for violation of the section. Civil penalties under the bill range from $100, 
for an interception committed in ignorance of the law, to $50,000 for a violation "com-
mitted willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain 
.... " H.R. 4727, 97th Cong., 1st SeBS. (1981). Stiff criminal penalties are also provided. 
The prescription of penalties for § 605 violations does not neceBSarily clarify the 
language of the section or explain the reach of the proviso. Faced with the penalties of 
H.R. 4727, however, it is unlikely that anyone will question the interpretation of § 605 by 
intercepting the signal of a subscription service. The Ninth Circuit's determination that 
STV is protected by § 605 would be a further deterrent to such an action. Therefore, 
H.R. 4727 would provide a strong disincentive to the interception of subscription ser-
vices, but it would not directly assist in understanding the language of the section. 
112. A direct broadcast satellite located in a geostationary orbit, receives signals 
from earth and retransmits them to small receiving antennae, known as earth stations, 
installed outside homes or other buildings. Broadcast satellites transmit both "free" (i.e. 
over-the-air TV broadcasts) and pay (i.e. MDS) programming. Since the receiving anten-
nae do not discriminate between pay and nonpay programming, individuals with earth 
stations may find themselves in violation of § 605. Furthermore, the strict penalties pre-
scribed in H.R. 4727 (as written when this Note went to preBS) will present a serious 
problem for private earth station owners unless they can recognize pay programming 
(perhaps through the use of scrambled signals) and devise a system to pay for it. DIRECT 
BROADCAST SATELLITES, supra note 53, at 7-8. 
For a general discussion of satellite communications, see A. BELBNDlUK & S. ROBB, 
BROADCASTING VIA SATELLITE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS (1979). 
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Perhaps one can view the Ninth Circuit's decision as a stop-
gap measure. By restructuring the interpretation of the proviso, 
the court ensured the viability of an infant communications in-
dustry. It is obvious, however, that we need a consistent policy 
applicable to both broadcast and non-broadcast services as they 
develop. 
In National Subscription Television, the Ninth Circuit 
rushed in to aid a budding industry. The responsibility for for-
mulating a national communications policy and protecting com-
munications, however, resides with Congress. It appears, there-
fore, that the battle against communications piracy should be 
waged in Congress-not in the courts. 
Marla Katz Westover 
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